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Short-term collateralized debt, such as demand deposits and money market instruments - private money,
is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the collateral backing
the debt. When the economy relies on such informationally-insensitive debt, firms with low quality
collateral can borrow, generating a credit boom and an increase in output and consumption. Financial
fragility builds up over time as information about counterparties decays.  A crisis occurs when a small
shock then causes a large change in the information environment. Agents suddenly have incentives
to produce information, asymmetric information becomes a threat and there is a decline in output and
consumption. A social planner would produce more information than private agents, but would not
always want to eliminate fragility.
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Financial crises are hard to explain without resorting to large shocks. But, the recent
crisis, for example, was not the result of a large shock. The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) Report (2011) noted that with respect to subprime mortgages:
”Overall, for 2005 to 2007 vintage tranches of mortgage-backed securities originally
rated triple-A, despite the mass downgrades, only about 10% of Alt-A and 4% of sub-
prime securities had been ’materially impaired’-meaning that losses were imminent
or had already been suffered-by the end of 2009” (p. 228-29). Park (2011) calculates
the realized principal losses on the $1.9 trillion of AAA/Aaa-rated subprime bonds
issued between 2004 and 2007 to be 17 basis points as of February 2011.1 The sub-
prime shock was not large. But, the crisis was large: the FCIC report goes on to quote
Ben Bernanke’s testimony that of ”13 of the most important ﬁnancial institutions in
the United States, 12 were at risk of failure within a period of a week or two” (p. 354).
A small shock led to a systemic crisis. The challenge is to explain how a small shock
can sometimes have a very large, sudden, effect, while at other times the effect of the
same sized shock is small or nonexistent.
One link between small shocks and large crises is leverage. Financial crises are typ-
ically preceded by credit booms, and credit growth is the best predictor of the like-
lihood of a ﬁnancial crisis.2 This suggests that a theory of crises should also explain
the origins of credit booms. But, since leverage per se is not enough for small shocks
to have large effects, it also remains to address what gives leverage its potential to
magnify shocks.
We develop a theory of ﬁnancial crises, based on the dynamics of the production
and evolution of information in short-term debt markets, that is private money such
as demand deposits and money market instruments. We explain how credit booms
arise, leading to ﬁnancial fragility where a small shock can have large consequences.
We build on the micro foundations provided by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and
Dang, Gorton, and Holmstr¨ om (2011) who argue that short-term debt, in the form
1Park (2011) examined the trustee reports from February 2011 for 88.6% of the notional amount of
AAA subprime bonds issued between 2004 and 2007.
2See, for example, Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2011), Schularick and Taylor (2009), Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009), Borio and Drehmann (2009), Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Collyns and Sen-
hadji (2002). Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2011) (p. 1) study 14 developed countries over 140 years
(1870-2008): ”Our overall result is that credit growth emerges as the best single predictor of ﬁnancial
instability.”
1of bank liabilities or money market instruments, is designed to provide transactions
services by allowing trade between agents without fear of adverse selection. This is
accomplished by designing debt to be ”information-insensitive,” that is, such that it is
not proﬁtable for any agent to produce private information about the assets backing
the debt, the collateral. Adverse selection is avoided in trade. But, in a ﬁnancial
crisis there is a sudden loss of conﬁdence in short-term debt in response to a shock; it
becomes information-sensitive, and agents may produce information, and determine
whether the backing collateral is good or not.
We build on these micro foundations to investigate the role of such information-
insensitive debt in the macro economy. We do not explicitly model the trading motive
for short-term information-insensitive debt. Nor do we explicitly include ﬁnancial
intermediaries. We assume that households have a demand for such debt and we
assume that the short-term debt is issued directly by ﬁrms to households to obtain
funds and ﬁnance efﬁcient projects. Information production about the backing collat-
eral is costly to produce, and agents do not ﬁnd it optimal to produce information at
every date.
Thekeydynamicinthemodelconcernshowtheperceivedqualityofcollateralevolves
if (costly) information is not produced. Collateral is subject to idiosyncratic shocks so
that over time, without information production, the perceived value of all collateral
tends to be the same because of mean reversion towards a ”perceived average qual-
ity,” such that some collateral is known to be bad, but it is not known which speciﬁc
collateral is bad. Agents endogenously select what to use as collateral. Desirable
characteristics of collateral include a high perceived quality and a high cost of infor-
mation production. In other words, optimal collateral would resemble a complicated,
structured, claim on housing or land, e.g., a mortgage-backed security.
When information is not produced and the perceived quality of collateral is high
enough, ﬁrms with good collateral can borrow, but in addition some ﬁrms with bad
collateral can borrow. In fact, consumption is highest if there is never information
production, because then all ﬁrms can borrow, regardless of their true collateral qual-
ity. The credit boom increases consumption because more and more ﬁrms receive
ﬁnancing and produce output. In our setting opacity can dominate transparency and
the economy can enjoy a blissful ignorance. If there has been information-insensitive
lending for a long time, that is, information has not been produced for a long time,
there is a signiﬁcant decay of information in the economy - all is grey, there is no black
2and white - and only a small fraction of collateral with known quality.
In this setting we introduce aggregate shocks that may decrease the perceived value
of collateral in the economy. A negative aggregate shock reduces the perceived qual-
ity of all collateral. The problem is that after a credit boom, in which more and more
ﬁrms borrow with debt backed by collateral of unknown type (but with high per-
ceived quality), a negative aggregate shock affects more collateral than the same ag-
gregate shock would affect when the credit boom was shorter or if the value of col-
lateral was known. Hence, the size of the downturn depends on how long debt has
been information-insensitive in the past.
A negative aggregate shock may or may not trigger information production. If, given
the shock, households have an incentive to learn the true quality of the collateral,
ﬁrms may prefer to cut back on the amount borrowed to avoid costly information
production, acreditconstraint. Alternatively, informationmaybeproduced, inwhich
case only ﬁrms with good collateral can borrow. In either case, output declines be-
cause the short-term debt is not as effective as before the shock in providing funds to
ﬁrms.
In our theory, there is nothing irrational about the credit boom. It is not optimal to
produce information every period, and the credit boom increases output and con-
sumption. There is a problem, however, because private agents, using short-term
debt, do not care about the future, which is increasingly fragile. A social planner ar-
rives at a different solution because his cost of producing information is effectively
lower. For the planner, acquiring information today has beneﬁts tomorrow, which
are not taken into account by private agents. When choosing an optimal policy to
manage the fragile economy, the planner weights the costs and beneﬁts of fragility.
Fragility is an inherent outcome of using the short-term collateralized debt, and so
the planner chooses an optimal level of fragility. This is often discussed in terms of
whether the planner should ”take the punch bowl away” at the (credit boom) party.
The optimal policy may be interpreted as reducing the amount of punch in the bowl,
but not taking it away.
We are certainly not the ﬁrst to explain crises based on a fragility mechanism. Allen
and Gale (2004) deﬁne fragility as the degree to which ”...small shocks have dispro-
portionately large effects.” Some literature shows how small shocks may have large
effects and some literature shows how the same shock may sometimes have large
effects and sometimes small effects. Our work tackles both aspects of fragility.
3Among papers that highlight magniﬁcation, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that
leverage can have a large ampliﬁcation effect. This ampliﬁcation mechanism relies
on feedback effects to collateral value over time, while our mechanism is about a
sudden informational regime switch. In our setting, there is a sudden change in the
information environment; agents produce information and some collateral turns out
to be worthless, or ﬁrms cut back on their borrowing to prevent information produc-
tion. Furthermore, while their ampliﬁcation mechanism works through the price of
collateral, our works through the volume of collateral available in the economy.
Papers that focus on potential different effects of the same shock are based on mul-
tiplicity. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for example, show that banks are vulnerable
to random external events (sunspots) when beliefs about the solvency of banks are
self-fulﬁlling.3 Our work departs from this literature because fragility evolves en-
dogenously over time and it is not based on equilibria multiplicity but by switches
between uniquely determined information regimes.
Our paper is also related to the literature on leverage cycles developed by Geanakop-
los (1997, 2010) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2010), but highlights the role of informa-
tion production in fueling those cycles. Finally, there are a number of papers in which
agents choose not to produce information ex ante and then may regret this ex post.
Examples are the work of Hanson and Sunderam (2010), Pagano and Volpin (2010),
Andolfatto (2010) and Andolfatto, Berensten, and Waller (2011). Like us these models
have endogenous information production, but our work describes the endogenous
dynamics and real effects of such information.
In the next Section we present a single period setting and study the information prop-
erties of debt. In Section 3 we study the aggregate and dynamic implications of infor-
mation. We consider policy implications in Section 4. In Section 5 we present some
brief empirical evidence. In Section 6, we conclude.
3Other examples include Lagunoff and Schreft (1999), Allen and Gale (2004) and Ordonez (2011).
42 A Single Period Model
2.1 Setting
There are two types of agents in the economy, each with mass 1 – ﬁrms and house-
holds – and two types of goods – numeraire and ”land”. Agents are risk neutral and
derive utility from consuming numeraire at the end of the period. While numeraire
is productive and reproducible – it can be used to produce more numeraire – land is
not. Since numeraire is also used as ”capital” we denote it by K.
Only ﬁrms have access to an inelastic ﬁxed supply of non-transferrable managerial
skills, which we denote by L. These skills can be combined with numeraire in a






AminfK;Lg with prob. q
0 with prob. (1   q)
We assume production is efﬁcient, qA > 1. Then, the optimal scale of numeraire in
production is simply by K = L.
Householdsandﬁrmsnotonlydifferontheirmanagerialskills, butalsointheirinitial
endowment. Ontheonehand, householdsarebornwithanendowmentofnumeraire
 K > K, enough to sustain optimal production in the economy. On the other hand,
ﬁrms are born with land (one unit of land per ﬁrm), but no numeraire.4
Even when non-productive, land has a potential value. If land is ”good”, it delivers
C units of K at the end of the period. If land is ”bad”, it does not deliver anything.
Observing the quality of land costs  units of numeraire. We assume a fraction ^ p of
land is good. At the beginning of the period, different units of land i can potentially
have different perceptions about being good. We denote these priors pi and assume
them commonly known by all agents. To ﬁx ideas it is useful to think of an example.
Assume oil is the intrinsic value of land. Land is good if it has oil underneath, with
a market value C in terms of numeraire. Land is bad if it does not have any oil un-
derneath. Oil is non-observable at ﬁrst sight, but there is a common perception about
4This is just a normalization. We can alternatively assume ﬁrms also have an endowment of nu-
meraraire  Kfirms where  Kfirms < K <  K +  Kfirms.
5the probability each unit of land has oil underneath, which is possible to conﬁrm by
drilling the land at a cost .
In this simple setting, resources are in the wrong hands. Households only have nu-
meraire while ﬁrms only have managerial skills, but production requires both inputs
in the same hands. Since production is efﬁcient, if output were veriﬁable it would be
possible for households to lend the optimal amount of numeraire K to ﬁrms using
state contingent claims. In contrast, if output were non-veriﬁable, ﬁrms would never
repay and households would never be willing to lend.
We will focus in this later case in which ﬁrms can hide the numeraire. However,
we will assume ﬁrms cannot hide land, what renders land useful as collateral. Firms
can promise to transfer a fraction of land to households in the event of not repaying
numeraire, which relaxes the ﬁnancial constraint from output non-veriﬁability.
The perception about the quality of collateral then becomes critical in facilitating
loans. To be precise, we will assume that C > K. This implies that all land that
is known to be good can sustain the optimal loan, K. Contrarily, all land that is
known to be bad is not able sustain any loan.5 But more generally, how much can a
ﬁrm with a piece of land that is good with probability p borrow? Is information about
the true value of the collateral generated or not?
2.2 Optimal loan for a single ﬁrm
In this section we study the optimal short-term collateralized debt for a single ﬁrm,
considering the possibility that lenders may want to produce information about col-
lateral. In this paper we study a single-sided information problem, since the bor-
rower does not having resources in terms of numeraire to learn about the collateral.
In a companion paper, Gorton and Ordonez (2012) extend the model to allow both
borrowers and lenders being able to learn the collateral value.
Since ﬁrmscan computethe incentives ofhouseholds to acquireinformation, theyop-
timally choose between debt that triggers information production or not. Triggering
5Since we assume C > K, the issue arises of whether the excess of good collateral could be sold
to ﬁnance optimal borrowing by another ﬁrm in the economy. We rule this out, implicitly assuming
that the original ﬁrm uniquely is needed to maintain the collateral value. Consequently, collateral’s
ownership is effectively indivisible in terms of maintaining its value. For example, in the real world if
the originator, sponsor, and servicer of a mortgage-backed security are the same ﬁrm, the collateral is
of high value, but collateral’s value deteriorates when these roles are separated.
6informationproduction(information-sensitivedebt)iscostlybecauseitraisesthecost
of borrowing to compensate for the monitoring cost . However, not triggering infor-
mation production (information-insensitive debt) may also be costly because it may
imply less borrowing to discourage lenders from producing information. This trade-
off determines the information-sensitiveness of the debt and, ultimately the volume
of information in the economy and the information dynamics.
2.2.1 Information-Sensitive Debt
Lenders can learn the true value of the borrower’s land by paying an amount  of
numeraire. Wheninformationisgenerated, itbecomespublicattheendoftheperiod,
but not immediately. This introduces incentives for households to obtain information
beforelendingandindividuallytakeadvantageofsuchinformationbeforeitbecomes
common knowledge. Assume lenders are competitive.6 Then:
p(qRIS + (1   q)xISC   K) = :
where K is the size of the loan, RIS is the face value of the debt and xIS the fraction
of land posted by the ﬁrm as collateral.
In this setting debt is risk-free. It is clear the ﬁrm should pay the same in case of
success or failure. If RIS > xISC, the ﬁrm would always default, handing in the
collateral rather than repaying the debt. But, if RIS < xISC the ﬁrm would always
sell the collateral directly at a price C and repay lenders RIS. This condition pins
down the fraction of collateral posted by a ﬁrm, as a function of p :




This implies that it is feasible for ﬁrms to borrow the optimal scale K only if
pK+
pC 
1, or if p 

C K. If this condition is not fulﬁlled, the ﬁrm can only borrow K =
pC 
p < K when posting the whole unit of good land as collateral. Finally, it is not
feasible to borrow at all if pC < .
6It is simple to modify the model to sustain this assumption. For example if only a fraction of ﬁrms
have skills L, there will be more lenders than borrowers.
7Expected net proﬁts (net of the land value pC) from information-sensitive debt, are
E(jp;IS) = p(qAK   xISC):
Plugging xIS, in equilibrium gives:
E(jp;IS) = pK
(qA   1)   :
Intuitively, with probability p collateral is good and sustains K(qA   1) numeraire
in expectation and with probability (1   p) collateral is bad and does not sustain any
borrowing. The ﬁrm always has to compensate for the monitoring costs .
It is optimal for ﬁrms to borrow the optimal scale as long as pK(qA   1)  , or
p 





C K (or qA < C=K), whenever the ﬁrm wants to borrow, it is feasible to borrow the
optimal scale K if the land is found to be good. We will assume this condition holds,





pK(qA   1)    if p 

K(qA 1)




Another possibility for ﬁrms is to borrow without triggering information acquisition.
Still it should be the case that lenders break even in equilibrium
qRII + (1   q)pxIIC = K:





For this contract to be information-insensitive, we have to guarantee that lenders do
not have incentives to deviate, to check the value of collateral and to lend at the con-
tract provisions only if the collateral is good. Lenders want to deviate if the expected
gains from acquiring information, evaluated at xII and RII, are greater than the losses
8 from acquiring information. Lenders do not have incentives to deviate if
p(qRII + (1   q)xIIC   K) <  ) (1   p)(1   q)K < :
More speciﬁcally, by acquiring information the lender only lends if the collateral is
good, which happens with probability p. If there is default, which occurs with prob-
ability (1   q), the lender can sell at xIIC a collateral that was obtained at pxIIC = K,
making a net gain of (1   p)xIIC = (1   p)K
p .
It is clear from the previous condition that the ﬁrm can discourage information acqui-
sition by reducing borrowing. If the condition is not binding at K = K, then there
are no strong incentives for lenders to produce information. If the condition is bind-




(1   p)(1   q)
:
Even though the technology is linear, the constraint on borrowing has p in the de-
nominator, which induces convexity in expected proﬁts.










Expected proﬁts, net of the land value pC, from information-insensitive debt are
E(jp;II) = qAK   xIIpC;
and plugging xII in equilibrium gives:
E(jp;II) = K(pjII)(qA   1): (2)
Intuitively, in this case proﬁts are certain and given by the additional numeraire gen-
erated by restricted borrowing. Explicitly considering the kinks, proﬁts are:
E(jp;II) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
K(qA   1) if K 

(1 p)(1 q) (no credit constraint)

(1 p)(1 q)(qA   1) if K >

(1 p)(1 q) (credit constraint)
pC(qA   1) if pC <

(1 p)(1 q) (collateral selling):
9The ﬁrst kink is generated by the point at which the constraint to avoid information
production is binding when evaluated at the optimal loan size K; this occurs when
ﬁnancial constraints start binding more than technological constraints. The second
kink is generated by the constraint xII  1, below which the ﬁrm is able to borrow up
to the expected value of the collateral pC without triggering information production.
2.2.3 Borrowing Inducing Information or Not?
Figure 1 shows the ex-ante expected proﬁts, net of the expected value of land, under
these two information regimes, for each possible p. From comparing these proﬁts
we obtain the values of p for which the ﬁrm prefers to borrow with an information-
insensitive loan (II) or with an information-sensitive loan (IS).
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(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑞)
(𝑞𝐴 − 1) 
The cutoffs highlighted in Figure 1 are determined in the following way:
1. The cutoff pH is the belief that generates the ﬁrst kink of information-insensitive
proﬁts, below which ﬁrms have to reduce borrowing to prevent information
10production:
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3. The cutoff pL







4. CutoffspCh andpCl areobtainedfromequalizingtheproﬁtfunctionsofinformation-






(1   p)(1   q)

(qA   1): (6)
There are only three regions of ﬁnancing. Information-insensitive loans are chosen
for collateral with high and low values of p. Information-sensitive loans are chosen
for collateral with intermediate values of p.
To understand how these regions depend on the information cost , the ﬁve arrows
in the ﬁgure show how the different cutoffs and functions move as we reduce . If
information is free ( = 0), all collateral is information-sensitive (i.e., the IS region is
p 2 [0;1]). Contrarily, as  increases, the two cutoffs pCh and pCl converge and the
IS region shrinks until it disappears (i.e., the II region is p 2 [0;1]) when  is large
enough (speciﬁcally, when  > K
C (C   K)).
7The positive root for the solution of pC = =(1   p)(1   q) is irrelevant since it is greater than pH,
and then it is not binding given all ﬁrms with a collateral that is good with probability p > pH can
borrow the optimal level of capital K without triggering information acquisition.
11Then, borrowing for each belief p, conditional on  is,
K(pj) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
K if pH < p

(1 p)(1 q) if pCh < p < pH
pK  

(qA 1) if pCl < p < pCh

(1 p)(1 q) if pL
II < p < pCl
pC if p < pL
II
2.3 The Choice of Collateral
Collateral is heterogenous in two dimensions, the expected value of land p and the
cost of information acquisition . If ﬁrms can freely choose the cost to monitoring
collateral , then it is helpful to think about which collateral is more likely to be used
when borrowing.
Above we derived borrowing for different p and ﬁxed . Similarly, we can derive bor-
rowing for different  and ﬁxed p. The next Proposition summarizes their properties.
Proposition 1 Effects of p and  on borrowing.
Considercollateralcharacterizedbythepair(p;). Thereactionofborrowerstothesevariables
depends on the ﬁnancial constraint and information sensitiveness.
1. Fix .
(a) No ﬁnancial constraint: Borrowing is independent of p.
(b) Information-sensitive regime: Borrowing is increasing in p.
(c) Information-insensitive regime: Borrowing is increasing in p.
2. Fix p.
(a) No ﬁnancial constraint: Borrowing is independent of .
(b) Information-sensitive regime: Borrowing is decreasing in .
(c) Information-insensitive regime: Borrowing is increasing in  if higher than pC
and independent of  if pC.
12Figure 2: Borrowing for different types of collateral
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The proof is in Appendix A.1. Figure 2 shows these regions and the borrowing pos-
sibilities for all combinations (p;).
If it were possible for borrowers to choose the difﬁculty for lenders to monitor collat-
eral with belief p, then they would set  > H
1 (p) for that p, such that p > pH() and
the borrowing is K, without information acquisition.
This analysis suggests that, endogenously, an economy would be biased towards us-
ing collateral with relatively high p and relatively high . Agents in an economy with
increasing needs for collateral will ﬁrst start using collateral that is perceived to be
of high quality, and later move towards using collateral of worse quality but mak-
ing information acquisition difﬁcult and expensive. Even when outside the scope
of our paper, this framework can shed light in rationalizing security design and the
complexity of modern ﬁnancial instruments.
2.4 Aggregation
The expected consumption of a household that lends to a ﬁrm with land that is good
with probability p is K  K(p)+E(repayjp). The expected consumption of a ﬁrm that
borrows using land that is good with probability p is E(K0jp)   E(repayjp). Aggre-
gate consumption is the sum of the consumption of all households and ﬁrms. Since
13E(K0jp) = qAK(p)




where f(p) is the distribution of beliefs about collateral types in the economy and
K(p) is monotonically increasing in p.
In the unconstrained ﬁrst best (the case of veriﬁable output, for example) all ﬁrms
borrow and operate with K, regardless of beliefs p about the collateral. This implies
that the unconstrained ﬁrst best aggregate consumption is
W
 = K + K
(qA   1):
Since collateral with relatively low p is not able to sustain loans of K, the deviation of
consumption from the unconstrained ﬁrst best critically depends on the distribution
of beliefs p in the economy. When this distribution is biased towards low percep-
tions about collateral values, ﬁnancial constraints hinder the productive capacity of
the economy. This distribution also introduces heterogeneity in production, purely
given by heterogeneity in collateral and ﬁnancial constraints, not by heterogeneity in
technological possibilities.
In the next section we study how this distribution of p endogenously evolves over
time, and how that affects the dynamics of aggregate production and consumption.
3 Dynamics
In this section we nest the previous analysis for a single period in an overlapping
generations economy. The purpose is to study the evolution of the distribution of col-
lateral beliefs that determines the level of production in the economy at every period.
We assume that each unit of land changes quality over time, mean reverting towards
the average quality of collateral in the economy, and we study how endogenous in-
formation acquisition shapes the distribution of beliefs over time. First, we study the
case without aggregate shocks to collateral, in which the average quality of collateral
in the economy does not change, and discuss the effects of endogenous information
production on the dynamics of credit. Then, we introduce aggregate shocks that re-
duce the average quality of collateral in the economy and generate crises, and study
theeffectsofendogenousinformationonthesizeofcrisesandthespeedofrecoveries.
143.1 Extended Setting
We assume an overlapping generation structure, with a mass 1 of risk neutral indi-
viduals who live for two periods. These individuals are born as households (when
”young”), withendowmentofnumeraire  K butnomanagerialskills, andthenbecome
ﬁrms when ”old”, with managerial skills L, but no numeraire to use in production.
We assume the numeraire is non-storable and land is storable until the moment its
intrinsic value (either C or 0) is extracted. Since land can be transferred across genera-
tions, ﬁrmsholdland. Whenyoung, individualsusetheirendowmentofnon-storable
numeraire to buy land, which is useful as collateral when old to borrow productive
numeraire.
This is reminiscent of the role of ﬁat money in overlapping generations, with the
critical difference being that land is intrinsically valuable, is subject to imperfect in-
formation about its quality, and is used as collateral. As in those models, we have
multiple equilibrium based on multiple paths of rational expectations of land prices.
In Appendix A.3 we discuss this multiplicity of prices.
We impose restrictions that simplify the price of a unit of land with belief p, to in-
clude just the expected intrinsic value pC, and not its potential role as collateral. This
equilibrium has the advantage of isolating the dynamics generated by information
acquisition from the better understood dynamics generated by beliefs about future
prices of collateral. Still, the information dynamics we focus on in this equilibrium
remains in other equilibria, when the price of land is increasing in p.
The ﬁrst of these restrictions is that information can be produced only at the begin-
ning of the period, not at the end. This assumption simpliﬁes the price of land and
also justiﬁes that ﬁrms prefer to post land as collateral rather than sell land at the risk
of information production. The second assumption is that each seller of land (each
old individual at the end of the period) matches with a unique buyer who has the
bargaining power (makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer). This implies that sellers will be
indifferent between selling the unit of land at pC or consuming pC in expectation.8
Under these assumptions, the single period analysis repeats over time. The only
8It is simple to modify the model to sustain this assumption. For example, if a small fraction of
households inherit an endowment of new land, there will be more ﬁrms selling land than households
buying land. Since sellers who do not sell just deplete their unsold land, the mass of land sustaining
production in the economy is invariant. In Appendix A.3 we relax this assumption.
15changing state variable linking periods is the distribution of beliefs about collateral.
This evolving distribution may generate credit booms but also credit crises. Hence,
there is a critical difference with models where credit booms and crises arise from
bubbles in the price of each unit of collateral, and this paper in which the price of
each unit of collateral is its fundamental value, and credit booms and crashes arise
from the units of land that can be used as collateral in the economy.
3.2 No Aggregate Shocks
We impose a speciﬁc process of idiosyncratic mean reverting shocks that are useful in
characterizing analytically the dynamic effects of information production on aggre-
gate consumption. First, we assume idiosyncratic shocks are observable, but not their
realization, unless information is produced. Second, we assume that the probability
land faces an idiosyncratic shock is independent of its type. Finally, we assume the
probability that land becomes good, conditional on having an idiosyncratic shock,
is also independent of its type. These assumptions are just imposed to simplify the
exposition. The main results of the paper are robust to different processes, as long as
there is mean reversion of collateral in the economy.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that initially (at period 0) there is perfect information about
which collateral is good and which is bad. In every period, with probability  the true
quality of each unit of land remains unchanged and with probability (1   ) there is
an idiosyncratic shock that changes its type. In this last case, land becomes good with
a probability ^ p, independent of its current type. Even when the shock is observable,
the realization of the new quality is not, unless a certain amount of the numeraire
good  is used to learn about it.9
In this simple stochastic process for idiosyncratic shocks, and in the absence of ag-
gregate shocks to ^ p, this distribution has a three-point support: 0, ^ p and 1. The next
proposition shows the evolution of aggregate consumption depends on the borrow-
ing of ^ p, which can be either in the information sensitive or insensitive region.
Proposition 2 Evolution of aggregate consumption in the absence of aggregate shocks.
9To guarantee that all land is traded, buyers of good collateral should be willing to pay C for a good
land even when facing the probability that land may become bad next period, with probability (1 ).
The sufﬁcient condition is given by enough persistence of collateral such that K(qA 1) > (1 )C.
Furthermore they should have enough resources to buy good collateral, then  K > C.
16Assume there is perfect information about land types in the initial period. If ^ p is in the
information-sensitive region (^ p 2 [pCl;pCh]), consumption is constant over time and is lower
than the unconstrained ﬁrst best. If ^ p is in the information-insensitive region, consumption
grows over time if ^ p > ^ p
h or ^ p < ^ p
l, where ^ p
l and ^ p
h are the solutions to the quadratic
equation

(1 ^ p)(1 q) = ^ pK.
Proof
1. ^ p is information-sensitive (^ p 2 [pCl;pCh])
In this case, information about the fraction (1   ) of collateral that gets an idiosyn-
cratic shock is reacquired every period t. Then f(1) = ^ p, f(^ p) = (1   ) and
f(0) = (1   ^ p). Considering K(0) = 0,
W
IS
t =  K + [^ pK(1) + (1   )K(^ p)](qA   1): (7)
Aggregate consumption W IS
t does not depend on t; it is constant at the level at which
information is reacquired every period.
2. ^ p is information-insensitive (^ p > pCh or ^ p < pCl)
Information on collateral that suffers an idiosyncratic shock is not reacquired and at
period t, f(1) = t^ p, f(^ p) = (1   t) and f(0) = t(1   ^ p). Since K(0) = 0,
W
II
t =  K +


t^ pK(1) + (1   
t)K(^ p)

(qA   1): (8)
Since W II
0 =  K + ^ pK(1)(qA   1) and limt!1 W II
t =  K + K(^ p)(qA   1), the evolu-
tion of aggregate consumption depends on ^ p. A credit boom ensues and aggregate
consumption grows over time, whenever K(^ p) > ^ pK(1), or






This result is particularly important if the economy has collateral such that ^ p > pH. In
this case consumption grows over time towards the unconstrained ﬁrst best. When
^ p is high enough, the economy has an average enough collateral to sustain on pro-
duction at the optimal scale. As information is lost in the economy good collateral
implicitly subsidizes bad collateral and with time all ﬁrms are able to produce.
173.3 Aggregate Shocks
Now we introduce negative aggregate shocks that transform a fraction (1 ) of good
collateral into bad collateral. As with idiosyncratic shocks, the aggregate shock is
observable, but which good collateral changes type is not. When the shock hits, there
is a downward revision of beliefs for all collateral. That is, after the shock, collateral
with belief p = 1, gets revised downwards to p0 =  and collateral with belief p = ^ p
gets revised downwards to p0 = ^ p.
Based on the discussion about the endogenous choice of collateral, which justiﬁes
that collateral would be constructed to maximize borrowing and prevent informa-
tion acquisition, we focus on the case where, prior to the negative aggregate shock,
the average quality of collateral is good enough such that there are no ﬁnancial con-
straints (that is, ^ p > pH).
In the next proposition we show that the longer the economy does not face a negative
aggregate shock, the larger the consumption loss when such a shock does occur.
Proposition 3 The larger the boom and the shock, the larger the crisis.
Assume ^ p > pH and a negative aggregate shock  in period t. The reduction in consumption
(tj)  Wt Wtj is non-decreasing in shock size  and non -decreasing in the time t elapsed
previously without a shock.
Proof Assume a negative aggregate shock of size . Since we assume ^ p > pH, the
average collateral does not induce information. Aggregate consumption before the
shock is given by equation (8). Aggregate consumption after the shock is:
Wtj =  K +






Deﬁning the reduction in aggregate consumption as (tj) = Wt   Wtj
(tj) = [
t^ p[K(1)   K()] + (1   
t)[K(^ p)   K(^ p)]](qA   1):
That (tj) is non-decreasing in  is straightforward. That (tj) is non-decreasing
in t follows from
^ p[K(1)   K()]  [K(^ p)   K(^ p)]
18which holds because K(^ p) = K(1) (by assumption ^ p > pH) and K(p) is monotonically
decreasing in p. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this proposition is the following. Pooling implies that bad collateral
is confused with good collateral. This allows for a credit boom because ﬁrms with
bad collateral get credit that they would not obtain otherwise. Firms with good col-
lateral effectively subsidize ﬁrms with bad collateral since good collateral still gets
the optimal leverage, while bad collateral is able to leverage more.
However, pooling also implies that good collateral is confused with bad collateral.
This puts good collateral in a weaker position in the event of negative aggregate
shocks. Without pooling, a negative shock reduces the belief that collateral is good
from p = 1 to p0 = . With pooling, a negative shock reduces the belief that collateral
is good from p = ^ p to p0 = ^ p. Good collateral gets the same credit regardless of
having beliefs p = 1 or p = ^ p. However credit may be very different under p =  and
p = ^ p. Furthermore, after a negative shock to collateral, either a high amount of the
numeraire is used to produce information, or borrowing is excessively restricted to
avoid such information production.
If we deﬁne ”fragility” as the probability aggregate consumption declines more than
a certain value, then the next corollary immediately follows from Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 Given a structure of negative aggregate shocks, the fragility of an economy
increases with the number of periods the debt in the economy has been informationally-
insensitive, and hence increases with the fraction of collateral that is of unknown quality.
In the next proposition we show that information acquisition speeds up recoveries.
Proposition 4 Information and recoveries.
Assume ^ p > pH and a negative aggregate shock  in period t. The recovery is faster when






K(1 q), where pCh <
^ p < pH. That is, W IS
t+1 > W II
t+1 for all ^ p < ^ p and W IS
t+1  W II
t+1 otherwise.
Proof If the negative shock happens in period t, the belief distribution is f() = t^ p,
f(^ p) = (1   t) and f(0) = t(1   ^ p).
19In period t + 1, if information is acquired (IS case), after idiosyncratic shocks are
realized, the belief distribution is fIS(1) = ^ p(1 t), fIS() = t+1^ p, fIS(^ p) = (1 ),




t+1 = K + [^ p(1   
t)K
 + 
t+1^ pK() + (1   )K(^ p)](qA   1): (9)
In period t + 1, if information is not acquired (II case), after idiosyncratic shocks are
realized, the belief distribution is fII() = t+1^ p, fII(^ p) = (1   ), fII(^ p) = (1   t),
fII(0) = t+1(1   ^ p). Hence, aggregate consumption at t + 1 in the II scenario is,
W
II
t+1 = K + [
t+1^ pK() + (1   






t+1 = (1   
t)(qA   1)[^ pK
   K(^ p)]: (11)
This expression is non-negative for all ^ pK  K(^ p), or alternatively, for all ^ p <






K(1 q). From equation (6), pCh < ^ p < pH. Q.E.D.
The intuition for this proposition is the following. When information is acquired after
a negative shock, not only are a lot of resources spent in acquiring information but
also only a fraction ^ p of collateral can sustain the maximum borrowing K. When
information is not acquired after a negative shock, collateral that remains with belief
^ p will restrict credit in the following periods, until beliefs move back to ^ p. This is
equivalent to restricting credit proportional to monitoring costs in subsequent peri-
ods. Not producing information causes a kind of debt overhang going forward. The
proposition generates the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 There exists a range of negative aggregate shocks ( such that ^ p 2 [pCh;^ p]) in
which agents do not acquire information, but recovery would be faster if they did.
The next Proposition describes the evolution of the standard deviation of beliefs in
the economy during a credit boom. This proposition will be the basis of the empirical
analysis in Section 5.
20Proposition 5 During a credit boom, the standard deviation of beliefs declines.
Proof Assume at period 0 that the belief distribution is f(0) = 1  ^ p and f(1) = ^ p. The
original variance of beliefs is
V ar0(p) = ^ p
2(1   ^ p) + (1   ^ p)
2^ p = ^ p(1   ^ p):
At period t, during a credit boom, the belief distribution is f(0) = t(1   ^ p), f(^ p) =
1   t and f(1) = t^ p. Then, at period t the variance of beliefs is
V art(pjII) = 
t[^ p
2(1   ^ p) + (1   ^ p)
2^ p] = 
t^ p(1   ^ p);
decreasing in the length of the boom t. Q.E.D.
Finally, the next Proposition describes the evolution of the standard deviation of be-
liefs in the economy during a crisis.
Proposition 6 The increase in the dispersion of beliefs after a crisis is larger after a longer
boom.
For a negative aggregate shock  that triggers information about collateral with belief ^ p, the
increase of the standard deviation of beliefs is increasing in the length of the credit boom t.
Proof Assume a shock  at period t that triggers information acquisition about collat-
eral with belief ^ p. If the shock is ”small” ( > pCh), there is no information acquisition
about collateral known to be good before the shock. If the shock is ”large” ( < pCh),
there is information acquisition about collateral known to be good before the shock.
Now we study these two cases when the shock arises after a credit boom of length t.
1.  > pCh. The distribution of beliefs in case information is generated is given by
f(0) = t(1  ^ p)+(1 t)(1 ^ p), f() = t^ p and f(1) = (1 t)^ p. Then, at period t
the variance of beliefs with information production is
V art(pjIS) = 
t^ p(1   ^ p)
2 + (1   
t)^ p(1   ^ p);
Then
V art(pjIS)   V art(pjII) = (1   
t)^ p(1   ^ p)   
t^ p(1   ^ p)(1   
2);
21increasing in the length of the boom t.
2.  < pCh. The distribution of beliefs in case information is produced is given by
f(0) = t(1  ^ p)+(1 t(1  ^ p))(1 ^ p), and f(1) = (1 t(1  ^ p))^ p. Then, at period
t the variance of beliefs with information production is
V art(pjIS) = 
t^ p(1   ^ p)
2^ p + (1   
t(1   ^ p))^ p(1   ^ p);
Then
V art(pjIS)   V art(pjII) = (1   
t(1   ^ p))^ p(1   ^ p)   
t^ p(1   ^ p)(1   
2^ p);
also increasing in the length of the boom t.
The change in the variance of beliefs also depends on the size of the shock. For very
large shocks ( ! 0) the variance can decline. This decline is lower the larger is t.
Q.E.D.
3.4 Numerical Illustration
In this subsection we illustrate our dynamic results with a numerical example. We
assume idiosyncratic shocks happen with probability (1 ) = 0:1, in which case the
collateral becomes good with probability ^ p = 0:92. Other parameters are q = 0:6, A =
3 (investment is efﬁcient and generates a return of 80%),  K = 10, L = K = 7 (the
endowment is large enough to allow for optimal investment), C = 15 and  = 0:35.
Given these parameters we can obtain the relevant cutoffs for our analysis. Specif-
ically, pH = 0:88, pL
II = 0:06 and the region of beliefs p 2 [0:22;0:84] is information
sensitive. Figure 3 plots the ex-ante expected proﬁts with information sensitive and
insensitive debt, and the respective cutoffs.
Using these cutoffs in each period, we simulate the model for 100 periods. At period
0 there is perfect information about the true quality of all collateral in the economy.
Over time, idiosyncratic shocks make information to vanish unless it is replenished.
The dynamics of consumption arises from the dynamics of belief distribution.
We introduce a negative aggregate shock that transforms a fraction (1 ) of good col-
lateral into bad collateral in periods 5 and 50. We also introduce a positive aggregate
22Figure 3: Expected Proﬁts and Cutoffs





























shock that transforms a fraction 0:25 of bad collateral into good collateral in period 30.
We compute the dynamic reaction of consumption in the economy for different sizes
of negative aggregate shocks,  = 0:97,  = 0:91 and  = 0:90. We will see that small
differences in the size of a negative shock can have large dynamic consequences.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the average quality of collateral for the three negative
and the positive aggregate shocks we assume. Aggregate shocks have a temporary
effect on the quality of collateral because mean reversion makes average quality con-
verge back to ^ p = 0:92. We choose the size of the negative aggregate shocks to guar-
antee that ^ p is above pH when  = 0:97, is between pCh and pH when  = 0:91 and is
less than pCh when  = 0:90.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of aggregate consumption for the three negative aggre-
gate shocks. A couple of features are worth noting. First, if  = 0:97, the aggregate
shock is small enough such that it does not constrain borrowing and does not modify
the evolution of consumption. Second, the positive shock does not affect the evolu-
tion of consumption either. Since ^ p > pH a further improvement in average beliefs
does not further relax ﬁnancial constraints.
As proved in Proposition 3, if  = 0:91 or  = 0:90, the reduction in consumption from
the shock in period 50, when the credit boom is mature and information is scarce, is
larger than the reduction in consumption when the shock happens in period 5. Fur-
thermore, consumption drops to a lower level in period 50 than in period 5. The
23Figure 4: Average Quality of Collateral












































reason is that the shock reduces ﬁnancing for a larger fraction of collateral when in-
formation has vanished over time. As proved in Proposition 4, a shock  = 0:91 does
not trigger information production, but a shock  = 0:90 does. Even when these two
shocks generate consumption crashes of similar magnitude, recovery is faster when
the shock is slightly larger and information is replenished.
Figure 5: Welfare









































Finally, Figure 6 shows the evolution of the dispersion of beliefs about the collateral,
a measure of available information in the economy. As proved in Proposition 5, a
24credit boom is correlated with a reduction in the dispersion of beliefs. As proved in
Proposition 6, given that after many periods without a shock most collateral looks
the same, the information acquisition triggered by a shock  = 0:90 generates a larger
increase in dispersion in period 50 than in period 5.
Figure 6: Standard Deviation of Distribution of Beliefs












































Here we brieﬂy discuss some issues that may have occurred to the reader. We have
motivated the model’s structure based on appealing to the micro foundations of
Dang, Gorton, and Holmstr¨ om (2011), where the best transaction medium is short-
term debt. In our model, as it stands, the land could simply be sold by the old gen-
eration (the borrowers) to the young generation (the lenders). This is because we did
not include a need for the young to have a transactions medium to use to shop during
their ﬁrst period, and before the output is realized. If there was such a market, the
young would need to use the collateralized claims on the ﬁrm as ”money.” That is the
idea of short-term debt as money. For simplicity we did not include such a market.
In the model the ﬁrms are also uninformed about their own collateral quality. Like
the households they do not produce information every period because it is costly. We
view this as realistic. There may be other reasons to think that ﬁrms could differ in
ways which are unobservable to the households, so that there are ﬁrm types. This
25is a well-studied setting and we do not include it here. The main reason for this
omission is that we have abstracted from the ﬁnancial intermediaries, which would
be screening ﬁrms and issuing liabilities to the households for use as money. This is
a subject for future research.
What about other reasons for producing information? We have eliminated all other
possible model embellishments and complications in order to focus attention on the
endogenousdynamicsofinformationproductionintheeconomywithregardtoshort-
term debt. Clearly, however, there are other reasons why information should be pro-
duced. For example, ﬁrms might want to produce information in order to learn their
best investment opportunities. The interaction of such information production with
the possible production of information about the ﬁrm’s collateral potentially raises
interesting issues. For example, producing information about ﬁrms not only induces
more efﬁcient investment but also leads to less borrowing in expectation. This is also
a subject of future research.
Finally, it is worth noting the differences between our model and a recent literature
in which credit constraints or other frictions generate ”over borrowing.” In some of
these settings private agents do not internalize the effects of their own leverage in
depressing collateral prices in case of shocks that trigger ﬁre sales. Since a shock is
an exogenous unlucky event, the policy implications are clear: there should be less
borrowing. Examples of this literature would include Lorenzoni (2008), Mendoza
(2010) and Bianchi (2011). In contrast to these settings, there is nothing necessarily
bad about leverage in our model, compared to these models. First, leverage always
relaxes endogenous credit constraints. Second, ﬁre sales are not an issue. In our










26First, we study the economy without aggregate shocks, and show that a planner
would like to produce information for a wider range of collateral p than short-lived
agents. Then, we study the economy with negative aggregate shocks, and show that
a planner is more likely to trigger information acquisition than decentralized agents.
However, when expected shocks are not very large or likely, it may be optimal for the
planner to avoid information production, riding the credit boom even when facing
the possibility of collapses.
4.1 Ex-Ante Policies in the Absence of Aggregate Shocks
The next Proposition shows that, when  > 0, the planner wants to acquire informa-
tion for a wider range of beliefs p.
Proposition 7 The planner’s optimal range of information-sensitive beliefs is wider than the
the decentralized range of information-sensitive beliefs.
Proof Denote the expected discounted consumption sustained by a unit of collateral
with belief p if producing information (IS) as
V
IS(p) = pK
(qA   1)    + [(pV (1) + (1   p)V (0)) + (1   )V (^ p)] + pC
and expected discounted consumption if not producing information (II) as
V
II(p) = K(p)(qA   1) + [V (p) + (1   )V (^ p)] + pC











+ Z(p; ^ p);




1  + (1   )
i
V (^ p) + pC.
The planner decides to acquire information if V IS(p) > V II(p), or
(1   ) < [pK
   K(p)](qA   1);
27while, as shown in equation (6), individuals decide to acquire information when
 < [pK
   K(p)](qA   1);
which effectively means the decision rule for the planner is the same that the decision
rule for decentralized agents, but with  > 0 for the planner and  = 0 for agents.
Q.E.D.
The cost of information is effectively lower for the planner, since acquiring informa-
tion has the additional gain of enjoying more borrowing in the future if the collateral
is found to be good. The difference between the planner and the agents widens with
the government discounting () and with the probability that the collateral remains
unchanged ().
The planner can align incentives easily by subsidizing information production by an
fraction  from lump sum taxes on individuals, such that, after the subsidy, the cost
of information production agents face is effectively (1   ).
4.2 Ex-Ante Policies in the Presence of Aggregate Shocks
In this section we assume that the planner assigns a probability  that a negative
shock occurs next period. The next two propositions summarize how the incentives
to acquire information change with the probability and the size of aggregate shocks.
Proposition 8 Incentivestoacquireinformationinthepresenceofaggregateshocksincreases
with theprobability of theshock  if p[K K()]  [K(p) K(p)], anddecreases otherwise.
Proof Without loss of generality we assume the negative shock can happen only once.
Expected discounted consumption sustained by a unit of collateral with belief p if
information is produced (IS) is
V
IS(p) = pK
(qA   1) + [(1   )[(pV (1) + (1   p)V (0)) + (1   )V (^ p)
+[(pV () + (1   p)V (0)) + (1   )V (^ p)] + pC;
and if information is not produced (II) is
V
II(p) = K(p)(qA 1)+[(1 )[V (p)+(1 )V (^ p)+[V (p)+(1 )V (^ p)]+pC:


















[K(p)   K(p)](qA   1) + Z(p; ^ p):
Naturally, the expectation of aggregate shocks reduces expected consumption in both
situations. The effect on information production depends on which one drops more.
The Proposition arises straightforwardly from comparing V IS(p) and V II(p). Q.E.D.
To build intuition, assume  is such that K(p) < K(p) and K() = K, for exam-
ple if the shock is small and p = pH. In this case, the aggregate shock, regardless
of its probability, does not affect the expected discounted consumption of acquiring
information, but reduces the expected discounted consumption of not acquiring in-
formation. In this case, producing information relaxes the borrowing constraint in
case of a future negative shock, and when that shock is more likely, there are more
incentives to acquire information.
Proposition 9 Incentivestoacquireinformationinthepresenceofaggregateshocksincreases




@ , and decreases otherwise.
Proof Deﬁne DV (p) = V IS(p)   V II(p), which measures the incentives to acquire
information. Taking derivatives with respect to , incentives to acquire information















The effect is clearly non-monotonic in the size of the shock. For example, at the ex-
treme of very large shocks ( = 0), in which all collateral becomes bad, the incentives






29increasing the effective cost of acquiring information. In this extreme case, the plan-
ner still wants to acquire more information than decentralized agents, but less than
in the absence of an aggregate shock (since (1   ) 
1 
1   1).
The previous two propositions show there are levels of p for which, even in the pres-
ence of a potential future negative shock the planner prefers not producing infor-
mation, maintaining a high level of current output rather than avoiding a potential
reduction in future output. This result is summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 The possibility of a negative aggregate shock does not necessarily justify acquir-
ing information, and reducing current output to insure against potential future crises.
This corollary suggests that there are conditions under which it is efﬁcient to accept
potential reductions in future consumption in order to obtain guaranteed increases
in current consumption. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Ranciere, Tor-
nell, and Westermann (2008) who show that ”high growth paths are associated with the
undertaking of systemic risk and with the occurrence of occasional crises.”
4.3 Ex-Post Policies
Now we study ex-post policies, conditional on a realized aggregate shock. Naturally
these policies affect the results in the previous section, since if they are effective in
helping the economy recover, they render ex-ante information acquisition to relax
borrowing constraints less important in the presence of aggregate shocks.
We consider policies that are intended to boost the expected quality of collateral after
a negative aggregate shock. The effectiveness of such a policy depends on how fast
the government is able to react to the negative shock, for example guaranteeing the
quality of the collateral. This policy manifests itself as a positive aggregate shock
in which a fraction  of bad collateral becomes good one period after the negative
aggregate shock, for example collateral guarantees by the government.
The next Proposition shows that, if there is a positive aggregate shock after a negative
aggregate shock that takes the average collateral ^ p to a new higher level above pH,
the recovery from the negative shock is faster if at the same time the government
prevents information production as a response to the negative shock.
30Proposition 10 Ex-post policies are more effective if information acquisition is avoided.
Assume a negative aggregate shock  that induces information acquisition (this is ^ p 2
[pCl;pCh]), immediately followed by a positive policy of size  that makes ﬁrms able to borrow
K (this is p0 = ^ p + (1   ^ p) > pH). This policy is more effective in speeding up recovery
if information were not acquired. More speciﬁcally II > IS (where II  W II
t+1j  W II
t+1
and IS  W IS
t+1j   W IS
t+1).
The proof is in Appendix A.2. The intuition relies on the speed of information re-
covery. Assume all collateral has the same belief and an aggregate negative shock
induces information that sorts out the quality of collateral. In this case, a successful
policy that improves average quality does not have a big impact. It does not increase
borrowing for the good collateral and only helps marginally the bad collateral. But,
if the aggregate negative shock does not induce information production, then a suc-
cessful policy that improves average quality increases the borrowing both of the good
and the bad collateral types.
Figure 7 introduces a policy that boosts the average quality of collateral in the numer-
ical illustration of the previous section. Speciﬁcally it assumes a policy  = 0:25 in
period 51, right after a negative shock. As can be seen, this policy is more effective in
speeding up recovery when the negative shock did not induce information.
Figure 7: Effectiveness of Collateral Policy









































This implies that, if the planner has access to a policy to deal with a crises, such as
guaranteeing collateral use, that policy is more effective if the original shock does not
31induce information acquisition in the economy. How can the government prevent in-
formation acquisition after a crisis? Possibly introducing a lending facility, ﬁnanced
through household taxation, that covers the difference between the optimal borrow-
ing and the level of borrowing that in equilibrium would induce information.
5 Some Empirical Evidence
In this section we brieﬂy examine the central prediction of the model, using U.S. his-
torical data. The prediction from Proposition 5 is that during a credit boom the stan-
dard deviation of beliefs declines. If information about collateral decays because no
information is produced, then the standard deviation of beliefs is shrinking and lend-
ing is increasing, leading to higher output. The empirical strategy is to examine the
correlation between the growth in credit creation (or output growth) and the change
in the standard deviation of beliefs from the trough of a business cycle to the next
business cycle peak.
There are a number of complications in implementing a test. We need to measure
credit creation and beliefs. With regard to credit creation, there are no consistent time
series that span a long period of U.S. history for credit creation, so we are forced to
examine sub-periods and use less precise measures. We will look at banks’ total assets
for most of the period, but to include the pre-Civil War period we will also look at
industrial output. In the model, credit creation and output grow one-for-one. The
bank total assets data are ﬁve or six times year from 1863-1923 and four times a year
thereafter. The output data, however, are annual.
As for beliefs, we need a proxy for the distribution of perceived collateral quality. For
simplicity the model is one in which ﬁrms have a constant expected marginal prod-
uct of capital, but in terms of the empirical work, we want to imagine that ﬁrms have
concave production technologies. In this case, expected returns can vary depending
on the perceived quality of collateral. We proxy for beliefs with the standard devia-
tion of the cross section of stock returns. The idea is that at each date we calculate
the stock return over a given period (annual or monthly) and then for that date we
calculate the standard deviation of the cross section of stock returns. We then have a
time series of the cross section of stock returns. Over time, as information is decaying,
the standard deviation of the cross section of stock returns should be shrinking.
32The focus of our empirical analysis is on the period leading up to a crisis, the credit
boom prior to a negative shock. So, we examine the trough-to-peak phase of business
cycles. In the period prior to the U.S. Civil War, Davis (2006) presents annual data in
a different business cycle chronology than that of the National Bureau of Economic
Research(NBER).FortheperiodpriortotheCivilWarwefocusonDavis’chronology,
as it is the most current, and we use the NBER chronology after the Civil War.10
Because of data limitations we look at the following ﬁve periods: (1) 1823-1914, using
annual data on output; (2) 1837-1914, using annual data on output; (3) 1863-1914, the
National Banking Era, using National banks’ total assets; (4) the Federal Reserve pe-
riod, 1914-2010, using banks’ total assets; and (5) the whole period from 1863-2010.11
Banks’ total assets data are four, ﬁve, or six times a year.12
We examine the pre-Fed period using three measures of credit growth. First, we will
use the annual real index of American industrial production, 1790-1915, produced
by Davis (2004). We use the industrial production index through the year 1914, after
which the Federal Reserve System is in existence. This series has the advantage that
it extends back to 1790, but has the disadvantages that it is annual and it is a measure
of output, rather than credit. However, in the model credit growth translates into
output.13
The second measure of credit growth is based on banks’ total assets.14 Data on Na-
tional Banks’ total assets from October 1863 until 1976 are from the Reports of the
Comptroller of the Currency. From 1976 to 2011 the total assets data are from the
Comptroller of the Currency Reports of Income and Condition (the ”Call Reports”),
which covers all federally insured banks. The set of federally insured banks is larger
than the set of National Banks (which excludes state banks), so the two series are not
consistent. This requires us to determine when to splice them together. We chose
10We omit wartime cycles. Davis (2004) says of the wartime cycles: ”Two Civil War cycles (1861 and
1865 troughs) are omitted. Although their inclusion would not meaningfully affect calculations.” (p.
1203)
11The Davis data is an index of real industrial production. We do not deﬂate the nominal asset
values for lack of data, which is only annual. But, since we are calculating the change in total assets
over short periods this should not be a problem.
12Until the 1920s the bank regulators examined the banks at random times, usually ﬁve times a year.
In 1921 and 1922 they examined the banks six times a year, and thereafter four times a year, eventually
at regular quarterly dates.
13It is also hard to match precisely with trough dates as those may occur in the middle of the year.
14One reason for this choice is that the detail on the individual balance sheet items changes over the
period 1863 to the present.
331976, which means that we lose one business cycle, January 1980 peak to July 1980
trough; July 1981 was the next peak. That is, we picked a very short cycle to omit.
The third measure of credit growth is simply the number of years or months from
trough to peak. We use this as a supplement to Davis’ measure.
Asdiscussedabove, wewillproxyforagents’beliefsaboutcollateralqualityusingthe
standard deviation of the cross section of stock returns. The idea is that the standard
deviation of the cross section of stock returns should decline during the credit boom,
as more and more ﬁrms are borrowing based on collateral with a perceived value of
^ p. That is, the ﬁrms are increasingly viewed as being of the same quality. For the
period 1815-1925, we use New York Stock Exchange stock price data, collected by
Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng (2001). Because Davis’ data are annual, we convert
the monthly standard deviations to annual by simple averaging.15 The year 1837,
following President Andrew Jackson’s veto of the re-charter of the Second Bank of
the United States, marks the beginning of the Free Banking Era, during which some
states allowed free entry into banking.16 We will look at two periods, 1823-1914 and
1837-1914. For the period 1926-2011, we use data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices. For each period we look at the cumulative change in the standard
deviation of the cross section of stock returns.
We now turn to examining the main hypothesis, the prediction that the cumulative
change in the standard deviation of cross section of stock returns (called ”Beliefs”)
is negatively correlated with the credit boom. As the boom grows, the standard devi-
ation of the cross section of stock returns should fall, as more ﬁrms are perceived to
be of quality ^ p. We examine ﬁve periods, as shown in Table 1. In the ﬁrst two rows
we measure the credit boom as the cumulative change in the Davis Index (”Davis
Boom”). After the Civil War, the bottom three rows, the data are ﬁner. We present
two measures of the standard deviation of the cross section of stock returns, one is
the raw measure and the other is a Kydland-Prescott ﬁltered version of the series,
using a smoothing parameter of 1400.
The correlations in all periods are as predicted, regardless of how Beliefs are mea-
sured.17 The evidence suggests that the cross section of volatility is related to the
15When monthly values are missing, the annual average is the average over the remaining months.
The entire year 1867 is missing; its annual value was interpolated.
16Also, the early part of the stock series has very few companies.
17Instead of treating the cumulative trough to peak variables as observations we could look at the
34Table 1: Credit Booms and the Decay of Information
3 
 
first two rows we measure the credit boom as the cumulative change in the Davis Index (“Davis Boom”). 
After the Civil War, the bottom three rows, the data are finer.  We present two measures of the 
standard deviation of the cross section of stock returns, one is the raw measure and the other is a 
Kydland-Prescott filtered version of the series, using a smoothing parameter of 1400. 
Table 1: Credit Booms and the Decay of Information 
    Correlations 
Period  Number of Cycles 
(Trough-to-Peak) 
Number of Years and 
ΔBeliefs 
Davis Boom and 
ΔBeliefs 
1823-1914  13  -0.16  -0.19 
1837-1914  10  -0.27  -0.10 
    ΔBeliefs and  
ΔTotal Assets 
ΔH-P Beliefs and  
ΔTotal Assets 
National Banking Era, 1863-
1914 
12  -0.37  -0.330 
Federal Reserve Era, 1914-
2010 
17  -0.09  -0.002 
Whole Period: 1863-2010  29  -0.23  -0.050 
 
The correlations in all periods are as predicted, regardless of how Beliefs are measured.
8
                                                           
8 Instead of treating the cumulative trough to peak variables as observations we could look at the change in each 
variable, total assets, beliefs or H-P filtered beliefs, during the trough to peak, in a panel.  In that case we are 
analyzing 29 cycles with 359 observations, 330 if we look at one lag.  We examined the panel regression of the 
change in the total assets, each observation period (four, five or six times a year, depending on the period, on the 
change in one of the measures of beliefs.  In both cases the results are a negative coefficient on beliefs 
(contemporaneous or lagged), but it is not statistically significant. 
 The evidence 
suggests that the cross section of volatility is related to the unobservable choice of whether to produce 
information in the economy. The endogeneity of the amount of information in the economy appears to 
be linked to the growth of credit and output. There is clearly more research to be done. 
 
unobservable choice of whether to produce information in the economy. The endo-
geneity of the amount of information in the economy appears to be linked to the
growth of credit and output. There is clearly more research to be done.
6 Conclusions
What determines the amount of credit (leverage) in an economy? What is the role
of information in determining that credit? We argued that leverage and information
are linked, and this link is the basis for ﬁnancial fragility, which is deﬁned as the
susceptibility of the economy to small shocks having large effects.
What determines the information in an economy? It is not optimal for lenders to pro-
duce information every period about the borrowers because it is costly. In that case,
the information about the collateral degrades over time. Instead of knowing which
borrowers havegood collateral and whichbad, all collateralstarts to look alike. These
dynamics of information result in a credit boom in which ﬁrms with bad collateral
start to borrow. During the credit boom, output and consumption rise, but the econ-
omy becomes increasingly fragile. The economy becomes more susceptible to small
shocks. If information is produced after such a shock, ﬁrms with bad collateral cannot
access credit. Alternatively, if information is not produced, ﬁrms are endogenously
credit constrained to avoid information production.
change in each variable, total assets, beliefs or H-P ﬁltered beliefs, during the trough to peak, in a
panel. In that case we are analyzing 29 cycles with 359 observations, 330 if we look at one lag. In both
cases correlations between total assets and beliefs are negative.
35Why did complex securities play a leading role in the recent ﬁnancial crisis? Agents
choose (and construct) collateral that has a high perceived quality when information
is not produced and collateral that has a high cost of producing information. For
example, to maximize borrowing ﬁrms will tend to use complex securities linked to
land, such as mortgage-backed securities. This increases fragility over time.
We focus on exogenous shocks to the expected value of collateral to trigger crises.
However in Gorton and Ordonez (2012) we show not only that crises can also be
triggered by exogenous shocks to productivity but also that they may even arise en-
dogenously as the credit boom grows, without the need for any exogenous shock.
We cannot measure the amount of information in the economy, or whether informa-
tionhas been produced. But, our empiricalworkshowsthat the standarddeviationof
the cross section of stock returns seems to be a reasonable proxy for the time-varying
distribution of perceived collateral value in the model. We presented evidence for
the predicted link between the beliefs and credit booms, looking at almost two hun-
dred years of U.S. business cycles. The evidence, while preliminary, suggests that it
is possible to test models driven by unobservable beliefs. This is a subject for further
research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Point 1 is a direct consequence of K(pj) being monotonically increasing in p for p <
pH and independent of p for p > pH.
To prove point 2 we derive the function e K(jp), which is the inverse of the K(pj),and
analyze its properties. Consider ﬁrst the extreme in which information acquisition is
not possible (or  = 1). In this case the limit to ﬁnancial constraints is the point at
which K = pC; lenders will not acquire information but will not lend more than the
expected value of collateral, pC. Then, the function e K(jp) has two parts. One for
p  K
C and the other for p < K
C .













(qA 1) if  < L
where H




(1   p)(1   q) (12)
38and L comes from equation 6. Then

L = pK
 (1   p)(1   q)(qA   1)
(1   p)(1   q) + (qA   1)
(13)













(qA 1) if  < L
where H
2 in this region comes from equation 4. Then

H
2 = p(1   p)(1   q)C (14)
and L is the same as above.
Itisclearfromthefunction e K(jp)that, foragivenp, borrowingisindependentof in
the ﬁrst region, it is increasing in the second region (information-insensitive regime)
and it is decreasing in the last region (information-sensitive regime).
A.2 Proof Proposition 10
As in Proposition 4, if the negative shock happens in period t, the distribution in
period t is: f() = t^ p, f(^ p) = (1   t) and f(0) = t(1   ^ p).
1. Without information, in period t + 1 the distribution of beliefs is fII() = t+1^ p,
fII(^ p) = (1   t), fII(^ p) = (1   ) and fII(0) = t+1(1   ^ p).
Apolicy introducedatt+1changebeliefsfrom to+(1 ), from ^ pto+^ p(1 ),
from ^ p to  + ^ p(1   ) and from 0 to .18 The distribution of beliefs then becomes:
fII( + (1   )) = t+1^ p, fII( + ^ p(1   )) = (1   t), fII( + ^ p(1   )) = (1   )
and fII() = t+1(1   ^ p).
Since we assume ^ p > pH and  > pH, the positive shock does not affect borrowing for
those beliefs. Since we assume  + ^ p(1   ) > pH, borrowing increases from K(^ p)
to K. Similarly, borrowing of known bad collateral increases from 0 to K().
Only individual beliefs change, not their distribution. Then, using equation (10), we






t+1 = (qA   1)[(1   
t)(K
   K(^ p)) + 
t(1   ^ p)K()]: (15)
18The same results hold if the policy is introduced in subsequent periods.
392. With information production, in period t + 1 the distribution of beliefs is fIS(1) =
^ p(1   t), fIS() = t+1^ p, fIS(^ p) = (1   ), fIS(0) = [(1   t^ p)   ^ p(1   t)].
After the policy, beliefs change from  to +(1 ), from ^ p to +^ p(1 ), and from 0
to . Also, beliefs 1 remain 1. Since we assume ^ p > pH and  > pH, the positive shock
does not affect the borrowing for those beliefs. Borrowing for bad collateral increase







t+1 = (qA   1)[(1   
t^ p)   ^ p(1   
t)]K(): (16)







   K(^ p)] + [
t(1   ^ p)   (1   
t^ p) + ^ p(1   
t)]K()

= (1   
t)[K
   K(^ p)   (1   ^ p)K()]:
In the range of interest, where ^ p < pCh and there are incentives for information
production, avoiding information production would imply K(^ p)  ^ pK  

(qA 1).
Using this upper bound to evaluate the expression above, we obtain that the increase
in borrowing at t+1 induced by the policy is larger when no information is acquired
than when information is acquired.

II   








  (1   ^ p)K()

 (1   
t)(1   ^ p)[K
   K()] +

(qA   1)(1   ^ p)
> 0:
40A.3 Land Prices that Include the Value of Land as Collateral
(Not for Publication)
In the main text the price of land just reﬂects its outside option, or fundamental value,
since we assumed buyers have all the negotiation power and make take-it or leave-it
offers. In this extension we generalize the results assuming Nash bargaining between
buyers and sellers, where the sellers’ negotiation power  2 [0;1] determines how
much they can extract from the surplus of buyers (in the main text we assumed  =
0). To simplify the exposition in the main text we also assumed no discounting (i.e.,
 = 1). In this extension we assume a generic discount factor  2 [0;1]
First we assume the case without aggregate shocks and then we discuss how the
introduction of aggregate shocks just enter into prices as a an expectation. We denote
the price of a unit of land with perceptions p as Q(p).19
The surplus of land for the seller is just its outside option
JS(p) = pC:
The surplus of land for the buyer is the expected proﬁt from a ﬁrm plus the expected
price of the land. If p is such that debt is information-sensitive, the surplus is
JB(pjIS) = E(jp;IS) + [pQ(1) + (1   p)Q(0)] + (1   )Q(^ p);
where E(jp;IS) = [pK(1) + (1   p)K(0)](qA   1)   .
If p is such that debt is information-insensitive, the surplus is
JB(pjII) = E(jp;II) + Q(p) + (1   )Q(^ p);
where E(jp;II) = K(p)(qA   1).
Then
Q(p) = [JB(p) + (1   )JS(p)] (17)
since Q(p) = JS(p) + (JB(p)   JS(p)).
1. Borrowing as a function of land price
Firms can compute the possible borrowing with both information-sensitive and in-
sensitive debt and determine which one is higher. In the main text we impose the
price of land as the sellers’ outside option and we determine the optimal borrow-
ing as a function of that price. Now the price of land also depends on the optimal
borrowing, and then they should be determined simultaneously.
19In the main text we did not need an explicit name since the price of land p was just pC.
41Inthecaseofinformation-sensitivedebt, RIS(1) = xIS(1)Q(1)andRIS(0) = xIS(0)Q(0)
because debt is risk-free. Lenders break even when,
p[x(1)Q(1)   K(1)] + (1   p)[x(0)Q(0)   K(0)] = 
where x(1)Q(1)  K(1) and x(0)Q(0)  K(0).
Inthecaseofinformationsensitivedebt, RII(p) = xII(p)Q(p)becausedebtisrisk-free.
Lenders break even when,
x(p)Q(p) = K(p):
with the constraint that
p[x(p)(qQ(p) + (1   q)Q(1))   K(p)]  





Q(p)   p)(1   q)
: (18)
In the main text, where  = 0, Q(1) = C, Q(p) = pC and then K(p) 

(1 p)(1 q).
2. Solving Borrowing and Land Price Simultaneously
We now show how to solve simultaneously for optimal borrowing and the land price.
1. When  > 0, ﬁrms with collateral p = 0 and p = 1 prefer to borrow without
producing information.
This is clear because knowing the type of the collateral (which is the case with
p = 0 and p = 1), it does not make sense for the borrower to pay .
2. K(1) = K
Since K(1) is not ﬁnancially constrained in the information-insensitive case,
then K(1) = K.
3. Determination of K(^ p), Q(^ p) and Q(1).




Q(^ p) ^ p)(1 q): This implies K(^ p) =
K and
Q(^ p) =
(1   )^ pC + K(qA   1)
1   
:




Q(^ p) ^ p)(1 q): Since Q(^ p) and Q(1)
just depend on K(^ p), it is obtained from equation 18.
42(c) ^ p is information-sensitive: When information reveals the collateral is bad,
and assuming the ﬁrm maximizes borrowing xIS(0) = 1. The following
two equations jointly determine K(0) and K(^ p):
K(^ p) = ^ pK




K(0) = Q(0) =
[K(0)(qA   1) + (1   )Q(^ p)]
1   
; (20)
where Q(^ p) just depends on K(^ p).
In these three cases K(^ p) is solvable, and the prices
Q(^ p) =





(1   )C + [K(qA   1) + (1   )Q(^ p)]
1   
;
arewell-deﬁned. Similarly, expectedproﬁtsfor ^ pinboththecasesofinformation-
sensitive and insensitive can be computed such that ﬁrms choose the highest
possible amount of borrowing.
4. Determination of K(0) and Q(0).
These are determined by
K(0) = Q(0) =
[K(0)(qA   1) + (1   )Q(^ p)]
1   
:
5. Determination of K(p) and Q(p).
There are two cases, from which the ﬁrm chooses the highest possible borrow-
ing:





Q(p)   p)(1   q)
:
(b) p is information-sensitive:
K(p) = pK




43where in both cases Q(p) only depends on K(p),
Q(p) =
(1   )pC + [K(p)(qA   1) + (1   )Q(^ p)]
1   
:
The determination of which regions are information-sensitive and insensitive is sim-
ilar to the case in the main text. Expected proﬁts with information-sensitive debt is
linear while expected proﬁts with information-insensitive debt depend on the shape
of the land prices.
3. Potential Multiplicity
In the previous steps we show how to solve the optimal borrowing when land prices
are endogenous. However these steps do not guarantee uniqueness of the solu-
tion (for example under information-insensitiveness, equation (18) does not imply
uniqueness). The intuition is the following: If there is no conﬁdence that in the future
low quality collateral can be used to sustain borrowing, this will reduce the price of
the collateral, reinforcing the fact that it will not be able to sustain such a borrowing.
This “complementarity” between the price of collateral and borrowing capabilities is
what creates potential multiplicity.
An interesting example is the extreme opposite to the one assumed in the main text,
this is  = 1. In this extreme case, the potential multiplicity takes a very clear form.
Assume an equilibrium where all collateral sustain borrowing of K without produc-
ing information, regardless of the perception p that land is good. If this is the case,





Given these prices, borrowing without information acquisition is not binding because
Q(1) = Q(p) and then K <

(p p)(1 q) = 1. As conjectured, all collateral can borrow
K regardless of p. In general, a larger  allows for the existence of an equilibrium
thatsustainsalotofcreditwithoutinformationacquisition, butfragiletobeliefsabout
whether land with low p can sustain high credit.
44